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Introduction
One of the economic dimensions in which countries differ the most is their level of income
inequality. These differences are relevant for at least two reasons. The first is that income
distribution is regarded as an important determinant of growth and economic development.
1 The
other is that the level of income inequality is informative about the access to economic
opportunities and about the extent to which development is shared by different sectors of the
population. It is even usually regarded as a measure of social justice per se, and implicitly, when
countries have low levels of inequality, they are thought of as countries that are doing
“something right.”
In the economics literature the most common approach to explaining international
differences in inequality has been to perform aggregate cross-country  regressions  that use
macroeconomic indicators as explanatory variables.
2 This literature has identified some
aggregate variables closely correlated with inequality differences, including financial market
development, education levels, geographic conditions, and institutional factors. But this analysis
has two limitations. The first is that the compilations of data on income distribution they use
have important comparability problems. For example, in the widely used data set by Deininger
and Squire (1996) the coverage of non-labor incomes is very heterogeneous, making it
impossible to know whether differences in inequality across countries are genuine, or if they are
due to the “noise” introduced by the lack of consistency in the data.
3 A second limitation is that
these studies are only able to use observable country characteristics to explain inequality, but
these may be correlated with other unobserved variables that also affect inequality. If unobserved
variables are excluded in estimating the effects of observed variables, their exclusion causes
unobserved variable bias in the estimated coefficients for the effects of observed characteristics.
This paper uses household survey data for 35 countries in six regions of the world to
investigate the microeconomic factors driving the large differences in inequality across countries.
Since our analysis deals with many elements that are not addressed by the more aggregate
macroeconomic analysis mentioned above, it could be seen as a complementary effort to this
literature. Furthermore, by taking a micro perspective, we are also able to address to some extent
                                                       
1 One of the latest literature reviews on this is the paper by Aghion et al. (1999).
2 Papers by Li, Squire and Zou (1998), Gavin and Hausmann (1998), IDB (1999), and Squire and Lundberg (1999)
are good examples of the growing list of works on the topic.
3 See Székely and Hilgert (1999a), Pyatt (1999) and Atkinson and Brandolini (1999).6
limitations of the aggregate approach. On the one hand, there are considerable improvements in
data quality and in the capacity to account for the differences in the characteristics of the primary
micro data itself. On the other hand, our approach clarifies some of the channels through which
aggregate variables affect inequality. Although this does not fully solve the problem of
unobserved variable bias, it provides insights into the “real” variables underlying the cross-
country differences and into the transmission mechanisms through which inequality is generated.
Our approach is to compare the distribution of total household per capita incomes—
which is the most commonly used concept of inequality—and then ask which of the elements of
the process of household per capita income formation account for the differences across
countries. Broadly speaking, we classify these elements into four sources of inequality. The first
is the distribution of labor incomes. The second are all sources of non-labor incomes obtained by
individual income earners, and which are linked more closely to capital and financial sources.
The third is the set of individual decisions that lead to household formation. These include
mating, fertility, household arrangements, and labor force participation.
4 The fourth element
corresponds to the distribution of the incomes that individuals receive because they belong to a
specific household (e.g., family allowances, means-tested transfers).
Knowing whether inequality in household per capita incomes is driven by labor market
incomes, non-labor incomes, or by the ways in which individuals join together to form
households is relevant because this information directs policy interventions towards totally
different areas. For instance, if inequality is mainly due to differences in labor earned incomes,
the most effective way to address the problem may be through changing labor market
regulations, or by providing incentives to change the composition of the labor force—e.g.,
through increasing education. If the answer is that inequality is exacerbated by family
decisions—e.g., if the poor tend to marry the poor, they have more children, and have fewer
income-earners—the policy priorities will be different. Perhaps the most effective way to reduce
inequality in this case will be through family allowances, facilitating the incorporation of low-
skilled women into the labor market, or family planning. Yet, if non-labor income sources are
what play a predominant role in generating inequality, the set of policies best suited to address
                                                       
4 These elements are not considered by standard decompositions of inequality by income source. Their inclusion
makes it necessary to take a different approach than these decompositions.7
the problem might be public pensions, financial policies, redistribution of physical assets, or
other interventions that have less to do with labor markets or families.
To assess the importance of each of the elements, we propose a simple micro-simulation
technique that recreates the process of income generation and family formation and which allows
isolating each of the decisions that lead to the formation of household per capita incomes. The
methodology is similar in spirit to the papers by  Barros  et al. (1995),  Cowell (1996), and
Cancian and Reed (1998), all of which use counterfactual distributions to assess the importance
of one of the elements of the process of household formation on inequality. However, our
method is quite different in three important ways. On the one hand, it connects labor markets
with inequality of per capita incomes by looking at the whole process of income and family
formation, rather than only focusing on mating, or earned incomes, as the aforementioned studies
do. On the other hand, rather than imputing or changing the distribution of incomes to reproduce
counterfactual distributions under some assumptions as in these studies, we modify family
arrangements through a simulation that follows the decisions that individuals make in reality.
The third important difference is that our analysis stresses country comparisons, rather than
concentrating only on single country experiences, which leads to broader conclusions.
The main limitation of our methodological approach is that, although the results are
informative on what  drives inequality from a statistical point of view, the procedure is a
descriptive accounting device. Strictly speaking, it does not intend to explain the causes of
inequality, because it does not account for general equilibrium effects or the feedback effects that
are characteristic of behavioral models.
5
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The first explains our methodology for
disentangling the aggregation from labor market inequality to household per capita income
inequality. The second presents our empirical results. The third presents robustness tests to check
if varying the assumptions about the process of family formation leads to different conclusions.
The last section concludes.
                                                       
5 The papers by Kremer (1997), Greenwood et al. (1999), Knowles (1999), and Fernández and Rogerson (1999)
address the question of the relation between family formation and inequality from a theoretical standpoint. These
authors model individual choices, and account for feedback effects between elements of the family formation
process. The works by  Haurin  et al. (1993),  Sutherland (1996) and  Behrman and  Deolalikar (1993) are other
examples of models accounting for the dynamics of household formation.8
1.  Methodology: From Labor Markets to Households
To perform our comparisons we estimate inequality by directly accessing household survey data
for 35 countries. We divide these countries into six regions, based on their geographic location.
The six regions are Latin America (LA), North America (NA), Western Europe (WE),
Scandinavia—which is distinguished from the rest of Europe due to its lower inequality—
Eastern Europe (EE), and Asia, where Australia is also included. Table 1 specifies the individual
countries in each region, and Appendix Table A1 shows the name, year and origin of each
database used.
Of the 35 countries in our study, we have direct access to 19 surveys. These include all
the LA countries and Thailand.
6 We label the sources of these surveys “LAC” henceforth. The
micro data for the rest of the countries are accessed from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
To minimize differences in survey years, we choose the household survey closest to 1995 for our
comparisons.
7 In the Appendix we present a more detailed discussion about the characteristics of
each survey and the differences across countries. Subtle differences in the classification and
coverage of income sources are important for our analysis because they may make it appear that
some specific sources play a more or less important role than others in the cross-country
comparisons. Although we are not able to solve this problem, one advantage of our
microeconomic approach over aggregate cross-country regressions is that we are able to identify
the importance of non-comparable income sources in terms of their contribution to differences
across countries.
Throughout the paper, our benchmark for comparison is the distribution of total
household per capita net incomes, which is presented in the second column of Table 1.
8 While
developed countries usually use some measure of economies of scale in household consumption
as well as equivalence scales, this is not common practice in developing countries. The main
reason why we focus on per capita incomes is that this definition has a clearer interpretation,
namely that it is assumed that there are no economies of scale in consumption and that all
                                                       
6 These surveys were obtained directly through country statistical offices and through the MECOVI program.  All
surveys, except those for Argentina and Uruguay, are nationally representative. In the case of Uruguay, the survey
covers around 90 percent of the total population of the country, while in Argentina, the survey covers around 70
percent.
7 In our empirical analysis we experiment with other years, when available, but our main conclusions are not
sensitive to the choice of a specific survey.9
individuals in the household have the same needs. Finally, throughout the paper we use the Gini
index of inequality because it is the most widely used measure, and it is practically the only
index used in the aggregate literature for inequality cross-country comparisons. However, our
method can be easily adapted to the use of other indexes, or equivalence scales.
1.1 Base Country Rankings and Household Per Capita Income Formation
In Table 1 countries are ranked within each region by the Gini for household per capita net
income (which we label  Ghh henceforth). As can be seen, there are huge disparities in our
sample. On the one hand we have Brazil, as the most unequal country with a Gini of 59.06
points, while the country with the lowest inequality of household per capita income is Finland,
with a Gini of 24.64. On average, the most unequal region is Latin America, followed by Asia,
North America and Eastern Europe. Western Europe has considerably lower inequality, while the
three Scandinavian countries in our data set have, on average, the lowest Gini.
The main idea of our simulation methodology is that Ghh is obtained through the mixture
of four basic elements, and so differences among countries such as those in Table 1 can be
thought of as a sum of the differences in these components. The first element is the distribution
of labor earned incomes among labor income earners, which can be thought of as the inequality
generated in the labor market. We present the Gini for this source in the third column of Table 1.
9
Following the standard classification in household surveys, labor earned incomes include
resources from formal employment, self-employment, and informal activities, but in the LIS
surveys incomes from self-employment are classified as household rather than individual
incomes. At the bottom of the table we include the correlation coefficient between labor earned
income inequality and Ghh. The correlation in LA and the other countries is very high, but not
perfect. Appendix Table A3 shows that in practically all the countries, these incomes represent
more than 60 percent of total income.
The second element corresponds to other sources of income that can be linked to
individual earners but that do not correspond to payments to labor as registered in the surveys.
As discussed in the Appendix, there is considerable variety across countries in the specific
                                                                                                                                                                                  
8 In the first column we show the distribution of gross incomes, where available, for reference. All Gini coefficients
are multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation.
9 The statistics for LA are different to the distribution of labor incomes presented in Székely and Hilgert (1999b),
because in that paper the calculation refers to household per capita labor incomes, while here we present the
distribution among income-earners.10
sources included in this group, and the surveys for Nicaragua, Honduras and Peru do not even
include information on them (Appendix Table A2). In general, they can be thought of as
resources that are obtained by individuals as a return to physical capital (in the LAC surveys),
financial resources (e.g., savings, pensions), or even as payments from insurance (e.g.,
unemployment benefits in LIS). With the exception of the Eastern European region and some
individual countries, these sources are typically distributed more unequally than Ghh (see Table
1). The correlation with Ghh is high in the LA countries, but it is rather low in the rest. Table A3
shows that the relative importance of these incomes differs substantially by country, and reaches
at the most 34 percent of total income (in Sweden).
The third element in the process of household per capita income formation is that when
individuals join together to form households, in some sense they “pool” the labor and non-labor
incomes they earn as individuals, and “share” them with other individuals that belong to the
same household. The degree to which “pooling” and “sharing” take place varies across countries
and households. The use of household per capita income assumes a “sharing” rule of perfect
equality, so the resources available to each household member depend on the number of income-
earners, and on the number of individuals that are being supported by this income. Two
individuals with identical labor or non-labor earnings may end up with completely different
household per capita incomes if they have different fertility, mating, household structure, and
time-use preferences. Similarly, two countries with an identical distribution of income among
income-earners may end up with differences in Ghh if family arrangements vary.
Table 1 illustrates the extent to which countries differ in terms of household structure and
family characteristics. For instance, while the average dependency ratio in LA countries is 1.83
non-earners per each individual income earner, in Scandinavian countries the ratio is only 0.12.
Household size also differs significantly, with LA households being more than double the size of
those in NA, EE, Scandinavia, and WE. Female labor force participation, which is related to the
number of income earners per household, is significantly higher in the most developed countries.
There is also a clear pattern of disparities in household arrangements, with LA countries and
Taiwan and Thailand having a higher proportion of extended and nuclear households, and the
other regions having much greater shares of single person households. The correlation
coefficient between Ghh and each of the demographic and family characteristics in Table 1 is11
strong enough to suggest that these are important components in the process of household per
capita income formation.
Finally, the fourth element is that individuals may be eligible for receiving certain
incomes only because they belong to a specific household. The last columns in Table 1 present
the Gini index for the distribution of these household incomes, as well as their correlation with
Ghh. In LA the correlation is quite strong, but the differences in coverage across countries is
considerable, and as discussed in the Appendix, the specific items included in each survey may
vary.
1.2 Simulation Methodology
In essence, the objective of our methodology is to test to what extent the differences in Ghh
across countries are due to each of the four elements. There are four specific hypotheses: (a)
Labor markets generate income differences so that even after individuals mix other income
sources, create families, and form households, the inequality persists. (b) Non-labor incomes are
distributed in such a way that, whatever the distribution of labor income and whatever the family
arrangements, in the end some countries are more unequal than others mainly because of the
distribution of these sources. (c) Differences between countries arise mostly when individuals
join together into households. This is because of the extent to which the poor tend to marry the
poor (rich), to which low income individuals tend to have more (fewer) children, and to which
individuals with lower (higher) income-earning capacity participate less (more) in the labor
market, varies across countries. (d) When individuals join into households they obtain other
incomes, precisely because they belong to a particular household, and it is these incomes that
generate most of the differences in inequality.
The first step for assessing each of these possibilities is to express the income (y) of each
individual income-earner j as the addition of the hourly labor earnings (yw) multiplied by the
number of hours worked (t), plus non-labor incomes (yk):
(1)  j k j j w j y t y y , , ) * ( + =
The per capita income (yhh,i) of each individual (i), belonging to household (hh), is expressed in
the following way:12
(2)
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where yj for j=h,s,ch,a,e denotes the income of each earner in the household. Subscript j=h refers
to the head of the household, s refers to the spouse or partner, ch stands for children, a are other
adults, and e are the elderly living in the same household. YH are the incomes that the household
obtains as a unit and that cannot be attributed to any individual member. The hh subscript for
each income-earner is not shown for simplicity. Thus, the numerator in (2) adds the resources of
all household members that report income, as well as the incomes received as a unit.
Since we focus on per capita income inequality, in the denominator we have all
household members introduced with the same weight. These are classified into household heads
reporting income (Nh,y), spouses that are income earners (Ns,y), number of children earning
income (Nch,y), number of adults earning income (Na,y), elderly earning incomes (Ne,y), plus the
number of heads, spouses, children, adults and elderly not earning income, but still living in the
same household ((Nh,ny), (Ns,ny), (Nch,ny), (Na,ny), and (Ne,ny), respectively).
With equations (1) and (2) in mind, we can view the process of family formation as a
series of steps between two extremes. On one extreme we have the inequality of hourly earnings
among labor income earners (Gw,t, which is the  Gini for the distribution of  yw,j), which is
regarded as the “pure” inequality generated in the labor market. At the other extreme, there is the
inequality of total household per capita income (Ghh, which is the Gini for the distribution of
yhh,i).  Ghh includes information on labor, non-labor, and family incomes (the numerator in
equation (1)), as well as labor force participation decisions and the process of family formation
including mating, fertility, and the incorporation of adults and the elderly (the extended family)
into the household, which appear in the denominator.
10
Our simulation for disentangling each element consists of linking the two extremes
through several intermediate steps in such a way that the importance of each of the components
                                                       
10 We take the distribution of hourly earnings as our initial point for the simulation because, as can be seen in
Appendix Table A3, in all the countries in our sample (with the sole exception of Sweden), labor incomes represent
more than 50% of total income, while there are only three cases where they account for less than 60%. We perform a
decomposition of inequality by income source (not presented for brevity) following the method by  Shorrocks
(1982), and in all countries labor incomes represent more than 50% of total inequality. Alternatively we could depart
from the distribution of non-labor incomes (presented in the fourth column of Table 1), and in fact, our main13
of equations (1) and (2) can be isolated. Specifically, we take Gw,t as a starting point and simulate
a situation where all labor income-earners are restricted to the following six conditions:
(i)  Each labor income earner works the same number of hours (with t>0).
(ii)  Labor incomes are perfectly positively correlated with non-labor incomes.
(iii)  Each income earner is a household head living without a spouse or partner.
(iv)  Each household head has the same number of children to support, and none of them is an
income-earners.
(v)  Each head has the same number of “extended” adult and elderly members to support.
These additional members share income, but do not contribute with resources to the
household.
(vi)  Labor incomes are perfectly positively correlated with YH.
It is easy to verify that under these restrictions Gw,t=Ghh, and that in reality the two
statistics will differ to the extent that the conditions do not hold. By relaxing one restriction at a
time it is possible to recreate the effect of each of the decisions that lead from Gw,t to Ghh. The
question is to choose a reasonable cumulative sequence for eliminating the restrictions.
There is evidence that in developing countries household formation has a pattern that is
similar to the life-cycle of individuals, so we can follow a similar path for household formation
in our simulations. For instance,  Attanasio and  Székely (2000) show that in LA and Asian
countries, the average individual in the earlier part of his/her life cycle typically belongs to a
nuclear household. When the individual reaches around 25 years of age he/she forms his/her own
household by joining a partner or spouse, and soon after, family size starts increasing as the
couple has children. When the household head reaches around 45-60 years of age, a considerable
proportion of households become extended units either by incorporating the elderly, other family
members, or non-relatives, or because children reach an age at which they start becoming
income-earners themselves and are therefore considered adults. In light of this evidence, a
natural path is to follow a similar sequence for relaxing each constraint, and this is the way in
which we proceed. It must be stressed, however, that the methodology could easily be adapted to
other decision-making paths. In Section 4 we explore other options.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
conclusions hold also under this path. We focus mostly on the simulation that takes the distribution of labor incomes
as a starting point because we believe it is more intuitive.14
By following the life-cycle path, we identify the following effects:
I. The “Hours Effect”: We depart from  Gw,t  which is computed including only individuals
receiving earned labor-incomes (that is, with t>0). One of the necessary conditions to make
Gw,t= Ghh is that all earners work the same number of hours, but we know that in reality this is
not the case. To account for the distributive effect of differences in hours worked, we go to the
micro data and multiply hourly labor earnings by the number of hours each individual actually
works. The distribution resulting from this is the inequality of total labor earned incomes among
individual earners (Gl). We call the difference between Gw,t and Gl an “hours effect,” but we
would like to stress that this difference is interpreted as an “effect” in an accounting sense and
not as an explanation for the level of inequality. This is because Gw,t and Gl are not necessarily
independent, and different individuals may decide to work more or fewer hours depending on the
level of their hourly earnings. Additionally, although highly unlikely, it is hypothetically possible
to have Gw,t=Gl even if there were differences in hours worked across individuals. For this to be
the case, the distribution of hours would have to be such that after multiplying hours by hourly
earnings, the position of individuals in the distribution switches perfectly symmetrically.
II. The “Other-Incomes Effect”: We also know that in reality labor earned income is not
perfectly correlated with non-labor individual incomes, but imposing the second restriction
simulates a situation where this is the case. To recreate the effect of relaxing the second
restriction, we follow two steps. First we perform a simulation that is equivalent to allowing each
labor income earner to obtain the non-labor income each receives in reality, and then compare
this new distribution of total income for each individual with Gl. In this way the sample of
individuals over which inequality is computed is still the same as for  Gl.
11 The second step
consists of including in the sample all individuals who earn only non-labor incomes and who
have been excluded so far from the calculation of  Gl. We call this inequality  Gy, and the
difference between Gy and Gl, is labeled “other incomes effect.” Intuitively, this is the inequality
accounted for by the fact that labor incomes are not perfectly correlated with other sources.
                                                       
11 It should be noted that even if the two distributions were identical, this does not imply that there are no
redistributions of income among individuals when non-labor incomes are added. It is possible that individuals are re-
ranked from the bottom to the top of the distribution and vice versa when including non-labor incomes, but if the
effects cancel out, the Gini will remain stable.15
Again, Gy and Gl are not necessarily independent, so the “other incomes effect” is also an effect
in an accounting sense.
12
III. “Family Effects”: Up to this point the restrictions are equivalent to a situation where
individuals do not merge together into families and where the population is only composed of
income-earners. Under our scheme, this implies  Gy=Ghh. However, we know that in reality
individuals join together into households through formal or informal arrangements, that they
have children, and that there is a wide variety of family structures and time-use choices
depending on particular preferences and needs. The reasons why individuals form households, as
well as the ways in which they choose to do so, are not totally understood,
13 and as mentioned
above, for this work we view the process of family formation as a sequential chronological
decision that follows the typical pattern of life-cycle decisions. This is similar to a process of
endogenous family formation where decisions are taken depending on the situation of the
household at each point in time. The process of household formation has four intermediate steps:
a)  “Mating Effect”: Chronologically, the most common decision that individuals make when
they decide to form their own household by leaving the parental unit is whether they want to
remain living as a single-person household, or if they prefer to make informal or formal
arrangements to live with a partner or spouse.  The third restriction imposed above actually
constrains individuals to live without a partner. To recreate the mating process and relax this
restriction, we go to the micro data to identify individuals with their real-life partner,
whenever they have one. Since in reality some individuals join with non-income earners and
some do not join a mate at all, we take two separate steps. First, we take the population
included in the computation of Gy and modify the data by joining individuals with their
couples and assigning each of them the average between their two incomes, rather than their
respective individual incomes. This can be thought of as a “mating effect” among earners.
Secondly, we allow all individuals to join their real-life partners, regardless of whether they
earn incomes or not. To do this we include all partners that do not report income and were
                                                       
12 Since there are important cross-country differences in the income sources included in non-labor incomes for
individuals (documented in Table A2), an alternative interpretation of the difference between Gy and Gl, is that it
illustrates how much inequality originates from the fact that the surveys are not strictly comparable because the
coverage of non-labor incomes differs.16
excluded from the sample so far and assign each member of the couple the average income of
both individuals. We label the new simulated inequality Gh,s, which is the distribution that
relaxes conditions (i)-(iii), and which includes couples with two income earners, couples with
one income earner, and other individuals who earn an income but that do not have a partner
or spouse. The difference between Gh,s and Gy is called the full “mating effect,” and it is
interpreted as the inequality accounted for by some individuals deciding to live as couples,
and the specific pattern of matches will determine the sign of the difference. The difference
between the full and the partial “mating effects” can be thought of as a “spouse participation
effect,” given by the fact that some individuals form couples with income earners and some
join with non-income earners.
14 As with the “hours” and the “other incomes” effects, Gh,s and
Gy  are not necessarily independent, since a spouse or partner’s decision to earn income may
be contingent on the other partner’s income.
15
b)  “Fertility Effect”: If restrictions (iv)-(vi) held in reality, we would have that Gh,s=Ghh, which
among other things assumes that all couples and single individuals have exactly the same
number of children and that none of these children are income earners. However, we know
that this is not the case, and we can relax this assumption by going to the micro data and
“allowing” children to join their real-life household. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First
we merge income-earning children, and secondly, we include the children that have not yet
appeared in the measurement of inequality because they are not income-earners. When
merging children into their real-life households we add up the income of the head, spouse,
and children, and split it in equal proportions for each member. This yields an inequality
index labeled Gh,s,c, where couples and children form nuclear households. The sample used to
compute Gh,s,c are couples (or single parents) with children earning income, couples (or
                                                                                                                                                                                  
13 See for instance Weiss (1997) and  Bergstrom (1997) for good reviews of some of the explanations that
economists have proposed, and  Sorrentino (1990) for differences in family arrangements among developed
countries.
14 It should be noted, however, that spouses that are not classified as participating in the labor market do not
necessarily work less. They may even work more hours than  those who participate, but do not receive a
remuneration for their labor. It should also be borne in mind that even in the case where there was relative stability
in the Gini through the simulated mating process, this does not imply that there are no re-distributions among
individuals and that there are no re-rankings along the distribution. It is possible that the Gini remains stable if the
re-rankings at the upper and lower parts of the distribution perfectly compensate each other.
15 As explained by Weiss (1997), when individuals form a couple they may also take the decision for one to
specialize in work at home and the other in market work, and the decision may be totally driven by the market
income-earning prospects of each member of the couple.17
single parents) with children not earning income, couples with no children, and individuals
that do not have a spouse nor children. We label the difference between Gh,s,c and Gh,s a
“fertility effect” that accounts for the fact that different individuals have different numbers of
children. As with the previous effects, fertility choices and the other individual decisions may
not be independent, and it is hypothetically possible (although highly unlikely) to have
Gh,s,c=Gh,s even if there were differences in the number of children across households.
c)  “Extended Family Effect”: Restriction (v) implies that all households are either nuclear
families, couples with no children, or single-person units. If this was the case we would have
Gh,s,c=Gh,s, but we know that in reality this is not so. Some individuals form households with
other adults. Chronologically, the following step in our simulation is to account for this fact.
As in previous restrictions, we simulate the process of extended household formation by
going to the micro data and matching adults and the elderly into their real life households.
We then add up the incomes of all household members and assign each individual the per
capita income of the unit. We perform the simulation in two steps, by first matching extended
family members earning income, and then merging non-income earners into their real-life
household. We separate the process by first merging adults, and label the distribution Gh,s,c,a,
and we then incorporate the elderly to obtain the distribution Gh,s,c,a,e, which includes all
household members. The difference between Gh,s,c and Gh,s,c,a,e is called the “extended family
effect,” which fully accounts for differences in household structure across individuals.
IV. “Family Income Effect”: Finally, the only difference remaining between Gh,s,c,a,e and Ghh is
assumption (vi): that labor earned incomes and family incomes are perfectly correlated. To fully
account for the process of household and income formation, we can go to the micro data and add
the family income that households receive in reality. This yields Ghh. As in the previous effects,
the difference between Gh,s,c,a,e and Ghh is the inequality accounted for by the fact that not all
households receive the same family incomes, but since these are not totally independent from
other incomes and from family structure, strictly speaking they would only be able to be
interpreted as an explanation of inequality under some special conditions.
So far we have assumed a specific cumulative sequential process of family decisions that
starts with Gw,t, and ends up to Ghh but it is clear that the magnitude of each of the “family
effects” will depend on the particular sequence chosen. If the incomes of each individual earner18
were interpreted as different income sources that the household head receives, our simulation
method would be similar in spirit to standard decompositions of inequality by income source,
which do not depend on a particular sequence of introducing each of the elements. However,
there is an important distinction. In standard decompositions by income source, to obtain the
contribution of each element, it is necessary to hold constant the population included in the
calculation of Ghh, which must be the same as the population included in the estimation of each
of the separate components. This clearly leaves out important information on the “family
effects.” So, by using our method rather than standard decompositions the results are path
dependent, but there is considerable gain in terms of information on the sources of inequality.
Another important issue is that, in reality, the magnitudes of each of the “family effects”
will depend on how individuals decide to share their income within the household. As mentioned
above, for our empirical results we assume on the one hand, that there are no economies of scale
in consumption, and on the other, that each household member is allocated the same share of the
available resources. Although these are perhaps not the most realistic assumptions, they have the
advantage of a clear intuitive interpretation.
16 In this framework, they imply that all “family
effects” will refer to the upper-bound impact of family arrangements. For brevity we do not
explore other possible assumptions about economies of scale or the ways in which resources are
distributed within the household, but it is clear that other schemes can be easily accommodated
in this framework.
3. What Drives Inequality Differences?
In this section we present our main empirical results from the application of the simulation
methodology. We start by focusing on comparisons across regions and then turn to differences
within each region and other country comparisons. In Tables 2 and 3 we present the distributions
representing each of the steps in the process of income and household formation.
3.1 Cross-Regional Comparisons
In Table 2, rather than starting the simulations with Gw,t we present in the first three columns
some more basic statistics of interest. The first column shows the inequality of hourly earnings
among males in the 15-65 age range. This is the most conventional measure of labor market
                                                       
16 Behrman (1997) presents a review of the literature on the distribution of resources within the household.19
income inequality, and it is considered more “pure” than our measure of Gw,t because it is less
affected by labor force participation decisions.
 There are some re-rankings across the six regions
as compared with the rankings in Table 1 by Ghh. While Latin America still has the highest Gini,
it is now followed by NA rather than Asia, and rather than having the Scandinavian countries as
the most equal, the lowest Gini is found in WE. The following column presents the distribution
of hourly earnings for females. In this case, the Scandinavian countries have the lowest Gini,
followed by EE and WE.
The third column shows the distribution of hourly earned incomes among all male and
female income earners in the 15-65 age range. The comparison between this and the previous
two columns can be interpreted as the effect of incorporating males and females into the
population. For instance, if we take the male population as the point of departure, the inclusion
of females has practically no effect in LA and EE, but it contributes to more inequality in the
other regions, especially so in WE. Alternatively, if we first consider the second column,
including males into the distribution of female hourly earnings only has a notable effect in EE.
Thus, it seems safe to say that the main reason why WE ranks as the most equal region in terms
of column 3 is because of the low inequality in hourly earnings among males.
The difference between the Gini in the third column of Table 2 and Gw,t  is the inclusion
of income-earners outside the 15-64 age range.
17 This has a strong inequality-reducing effect in
NA, Scandinavian countries, and WE, while it has strong disequalizing effects in EE. These
changes can be interpreted as the distributive effect of differences in labor force participation
rates among the non-working-age populations, and in some cases they are large enough to
reverse regional rankings. For instance, in the ordering by the third column EE appears to be
more equal than Asia and NA, with a difference of about three and almost six points,
respectively, while according to Gw,t they have practically the same inequality.
The starting point for our simulation is the fourth column with Gw,t. It can be compared
with Gl in the fifth column to measure the “hours effect.” There are considerable differences
across regions. While in LA and EE the “hours effect” is negative, it contributes to increased
inequality in the rest of the regions, and in NA and WE it does so considerably. The difference
between Gw,t, and Gl leads to some important re-rankings. Due to differences in hours worked,
                                                       
17 Note that the surveys for Norway, Finland, Poland and Thailand do not include information on number of hours
worked. In these cases, we report Gl rather than Gw,t, and we are not able to calculate the “hours effect.” Hours
effects are assumed to be zero in these countries.20
NA appears to be much more unequal than EE and Asia, even though they had practically the
same Gw,t. It is possible that the reason for the differences is that individuals with lower hourly
earnings work more hours in LA and EE relative to those with higher hourly earnings, while the
opposite is the case in the other regions. The first column of Table 4 presents the correlation
coefficient between hours worked and hourly earnings, and confirms that the correlation is
negative in LA, EE and Asia. One plausible interpretation is that income and substitution effects
from increasing hourly earnings are different at different levels of development. In the relatively
poorer regions in our sample, which are LA, EE and Asia, the income effect is stronger among
the poor, but as incomes rise the substitution effect kicks in.
To assess the effect of other income sources we first compute the distribution of total
individual incomes (including non-labor sources) among labor earners. This appears in the
column labeled (3) in Table 2. We then include individuals who are only non-labor income
earners to obtain Gy (presented in the last column). We also include the distribution of non-labor
incomes among non-labor income earners (excluding labor earners) for reference. The full “other
incomes effect” is obtained from subtracting the Gini in the columns labeled (4) and (2). At the
regional level, including non-labor individual incomes has the strongest equalizing effect in the
Scandinavian countries. The effect is also negative, although smaller, in NA and EE, while it is
positive in LA, WE, and especially in Asia, where including non-labor incomes increases the
value of the Gini index by more than five points. There are two important re-rankings that take
place after the “other incomes effect” is accounted for. One is that Asia is considerably more
equal than NA according to Gl, but it has higher inequality when measured by Gy. The other is
that Scandinavia and WE switch in their ordering.
It is tempting to interpret the difference between Gl and Gy as evidence of the impact of
non-labor incomes over inequality. Under this interpretation, non-labor incomes are, for instance,
less disequalizing in LA than in Asia, while they are strongly equalizing in the Scandinavian
countries. These disparities appear to be an important source of difference between the regions.
Note, for instance, that the difference in Gini points between Asia and Scandinavia according to
Gl is only about four points, while the difference according to Gy is around thirteen points.
However, as noted in the Appendix, there is great variety in the sources included in the non-
labor-incomes category in each country (Table A2). Therefore, the difference between Gl and Gy
may in part be a result of differences in income coverage or definitions. The difference may well21
be thought of as “noise” introduced into the distribution by including sources with differential
coverage across countries. In any case, one advantage of the comparison is that it provides a
good idea of the impact of including these non-comparable income sources into the measurement
of inequality.
Table 3 presents the “family effects.” For reference we include Gy in the first column.
There are four issues for implementing the following simulation. The first is the definition of
household head, which is the individual taken as reference to establish kinship with other
members of the household.
18 For simplicity we use the self-declared definition of head. The
second is to establish a cutoff point after which children are considered adults. We establish this
cutoff point to be 20 years of age, since at this age the share of individuals earning incomes
increases considerably in most of the countries in our sample. Therefore, a household composed
of a couple and children under 20 will be classified as “nuclear,” while a similar household with
a child age 21 will be considered an “extended family.” We experiment with considering all
individuals over 18 years of age as adults, but our conclusions are not sensitive to these cutoff
points.
19 The third is that in some household surveys it is not possible to know with certainty
what the relation between the head and other members is (e.g., if all children living in the
household are in fact children of the head). To implement our approach we classify individuals
as children or adults living in the household according to their age, which implies that they are
not necessarily related by kinship to the head. The fourth is that in some cases we are not able to
confirm if the head of the household and the individual identified as the spouse constitute a
formal couple or if they are joined by informal arrangements. For our simulation we do not make
any distinction between these two possibilities and always refer to the partner of the head as
spouse for simplicity.
Subtracting the Gini in the columns labeled (5a) and (5b) from column (4) in Table 3
provides the “mating effect.”  The differences across regions are even stronger than for the
“hours” or “other incomes effect.” The full “mating effect” is most negative (almost eight Gini
points) in NA, and of more than five points in WE and Scandinavia. About half of the full
“mating effect” is accounted for by matching income earners with their (income-earning) real-
                                                       
18 We use the standard definition of household in the LIS and LAC surveys, which is the unit including all
individuals that share the same budget, and where sub-units are counted as being part of the same household.
19 Note that other definitions that may be more appropriate for particular countries can easily be implemented within
this framework.22
life couples, while the other half is from matching non-earners with their partners. In the other
three regions “mating” also reduces inequality, although the effect is smaller. Another important
difference is that in LA, EE and Asia matching non-earners to their income-earning partners
actually increases inequality, rather than reducing it. This points to the importance of differences
in labor force participation among spouses in these regions.
The “mating effect” produces some important re-rankings across regions. Table 3 shows,
for instance, that the relative position of NA improves considerably with respect to EE and Asia
after individual income earners are united with their spouses into the same household. The
information in Table 4 helps to interpret these differences. The third column shows the
correlation between the income of the head and the spouse for cases where both are income-
earners. As expected, the correlation is much lower in NA, Scandinavia, and WE than in Asia,
LA, or EE. This suggests that in these last regions, there is greater assortative mating. In the
second column of Table 4 we present the correlation between years of schooling of the head of
the household, and schooling of the spouse whenever the head has a partner or spouse. This
could be interpreted as the correlation of the potential income-earning capacity. Asia and LA
also appear to have the highest coefficients in this case, but EE has a lower correlation, which is
similar to that observed in WE. The fourth column shows the correlation between the income of
the household head and all spouses, regardless of whether they are earners or not (incomes are
defined as equal to zero for non-earners). The pattern of lower correlation in NA and WE, and
the much higher correlation in EE, LA and Asia, holds, suggesting not only that  assortative
mating is stronger in these last regions, but also that the spouses’ decisions on whether to
participate or not in the labor market are also more contingent on the head’s income.
The “fertility effect” is obtained from subtracting column (6a) and (6b) in Table 3, from
column (5b). As expected from the demographic statistics presented in Table 1, the strongest
inequality-increasing “fertility effect” is observed in Asia and particularly in LA, while there are
only mild effects in the other regions. This evidence, added to the correlation coefficients in
Table 4, suggests that especially in Asia and LAC, the fact that some (lower income) individuals
decide to have more children than others is an important source of regional inequality
differences. The decision of incorporating children into the labor market also seems to generate
inequality because, according to Table 4, children of higher income parents tend to obtain higher
earnings.23
Column (7a) to (8b) in Table 3 presents the “extended family” effects. In column (7a) we
show the inequality index Gh,s,c,a estimated by incorporating income-earning extended family
adults, while in column (7b) we incorporate the remaining adults that belong to the household,
but that do not earn income. Columns (8a) and (8b) present the distributions that incorporate the
elderly (individuals over 65 years of age) that are not household heads. In NA, WE, Scandinavia
and EE, the total “extended family effect” is rather small, which is not that surprising given the
high proportion of single person households and the small share of extended family units
documented in Table 1. In LA and Asia, the effect of including the extended family reduces
inequality by about three Gini points, which is not negligible when compared to the previous
effects. One interpretation is that in poorer countries individuals have more incentives to form
larger households because the lower the income, the higher the gains from economies of scale in
consumption. Since incorporating income-earning adults into their real-life household (column
(7a)) drives most of the effect, this is also capturing differences in the age structure of household
members.
The last step in the process is to include the effect of the family incomes to which
individuals have access because they belong to a specific household. In the case of countries that
do not report these incomes (see Table A2), the Gini coefficient reported in column (8b) in Table
3 is equal to Ghh, while in the others, it is still necessary to subtract Ghh from Gh,s,c,a,e in column
(8b) to add up to the distribution of total household per capita income. In LA, NA, EE, and WE
the “family income effect” is rather small (less than one Gini point), while in Scandinavia, and
especially in Asia, it is equalizing. While the reduction in Scandinavia is not surprising because
of its long tradition of providing social benefits through family allowances and transfers, the
rather small effect in WE is quite unexpected. However, the results should not be interpreted
straightforwardly as evidence that family incomes do not contribute to reducing inequality in
WE. The variety of income sources included in “family incomes” may be large enough to blur
the country comparisons, and also, the effect may appear to be stronger in some countries simply
because the household surveys may be better able to capture these incomes. The “family income
effect” could even be interpreted to some extent as a measure of the quality of the survey
instruments. A low value may well correspond to the lower coverage of the source.
It should be noted that in our calculations we are not able to take into account the fact that
in some countries governments provide goods or services directly to the household, which are24
not accounted for as income. If in some country there is a well-established system of social
security that provides some services at no cost, while in another the government provides
families with transfers to acquire exactly the same service, in our simulation it would appear that
the “family income” effect is smaller in countries where governments choose to provide services
directly, while perhaps, after considering the monetary value of the services, the effect on
inequality could be considerable.
To summarize the conclusions about what drives differences in inequality across regions,
we perform the following decomposition. First, we compare the difference in Gini points in Gw,t
between each region, and the Scandinavian countries, which we take as benchmark because they
have the lowest Ghh. Secondly, we compare the magnitude of each effect, with the effect in
Scandinavia, in such a way that by adding up the difference we end up with the difference in Ghh
between this region and the rest. Figure 1 summarizes the results. In the horizontal axis we
indicate the region with which the Scandinavian countries are being compared.
The first bar corresponds to Latin America. At the top of the bar we indicate that the
difference in Ghh across these two regions is of 27.5 Gini points. This difference is decomposed
into each of the effects identified above. About one half of the difference is accounted for by the
inequality of hourly earnings, which are the disparities generated in the labor market. About five
points of the difference appear to be due to the “mating effect” reducing inequality much more in
Scandinavia, while about three points are accounted for by differences in the “fertility effect,”
which has stronger disequalizing effects in LA. Non-labor and family incomes account for about
six Gini points of the gap, but again, given the differences in income-source coverage, to some
extent this can be thought of as evidence of the importance of lack of consistency across surveys.
The gap between the regions is ameliorated by eight Gini points by the “hours effect” and the
“extended family effect.” This suggests that in LA individuals with lower hourly earnings work
relatively more hours than higher income-individuals, and relatively lower income households
have a greater tendency to “pool” more incomes by creating extended families.
The second bar shows that the difference with NA is accounted for mainly by the
distribution of hourly earnings, by non-labor income sources, and by family incomes. Family
arrangements account for a smaller part of the difference and in fact, the extended family and the
greater equalizing effect of mating in NA reduce the gap. The third bar corresponds to the
comparison between the Scandinavian countries and WE. WE actually has a better distribution of25
hourly earnings than Scandinavia. The higher inequality in Ghh in WE is accounted for by non-
labor and family incomes.
The EE countries have a Gini that is 12.4 points higher than Scandinavia’s. The most
important sources of the difference are the hourly earnings and the “mating effect,” which
reduces inequality by much more in Scandinavia. The difference with Asia is of 13 points. The
most important sources of this disparity are the distribution of hourly earnings, non-labor
incomes, and the “mating effect.” The gap would actually be much larger had the “hours” effect
not been less disequalizing and the “extended family” and “family incomes” effects not been
more equalizing in Asia.
3.2 Differences Within Regions
The case where the country-specific pattern conforms most closely to the regional averages is
Scandinavia. Eastern Europe is another case where the magnitudes of the effects by country
mostly have the same sign, but still there are differences in the size of the effects that change the
ordering. NA and Asia are two cases where regional averages do not reflect the pattern of a
particular country. In NA, the United States (US) has a Ghh that is more than eight points higher
than Canada. Practically the whole difference between the countries is accounted for by
differences in the inequality of hourly earnings, where the US has a  Gini that is ten points
greater. In the end, the gap is smaller because the hours effect has a less disequalizing effect in
the US.
In WE, with few exceptions, each of the effects has the same sign in all countries, but the
differences in magnitude are still strong enough to lead to re-rankings. For instance, in Table 2 it
appears that Luxembourg, which is the country with the lowest Ghh, has a similar Gw,t index to
the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK), while the differences in Ghh reaches up to
five, nine and ten Gini points, respectively. The five-point gap with the Netherlands is mostly
accounted for by a large difference in the “hours effect.” The difference between Luxembourg
and the UK is mainly accounted for by much stronger disequalizing “hours” and “other incomes”
effects in the latter. In the case of Italy vs. Luxembourg, the difference in the “mating effect”
accounts for the higher inequality.
With respect to LAC, the country with the lowest inequality of total household per capita
income is Uruguay, so we take it as a benchmark. Figure 2 summarizes the comparisons in a26
similar way than the decomposition in Figure 1. Two patterns emerge quite clearly. The first is
that the “mating effect” is more equalizing in Uruguay, so part of the difference between this and
the other LA countries is accounted for by lower assortative mating among couples. The second
is that the “hours effect” contributes to increased inequality in Uruguay, while it is equalizing in
most of the other countries, and where this is not the case, the effect is less inequality-increasing.
Surprisingly, although demographic differences between Uruguay and the other LA countries are
important (see Table 1), the “fertility” and “extended family” effects only account for a
significant part of the inequality difference in few cases. The distribution of labor incomes
represents an important part of the difference between Uruguay and the other countries, while the
“other incomes” and “family income” effects play a minor role.
3.3 Differences across the World
Keeping in mind the definitional and income-source coverage differences, especially between
LAC and LIS surveys, it is also illustrative to perform some comparisons across countries in
different regions. Take, for instance, the case of the US and the UK. These two countries are
well-known to be among the most unequal in the developed world, and the difference between
their Ghh indexes is of about three points. However, the difference in terms of the distribution of
hourly labor earnings is much larger, since the Gw,t index is of 44.25 points in the US, while it is
only 29.16 in the UK. The three effects that account for the major reduction in the gap are the
“hours” and “other incomes” effects, which are much less  disequalizing in the US, and the
“mating effect,” which has a stronger progressive impact in this country. In contrast, the
difference between the US, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, is practically
all accounted for by the higher inequality in hourly labor earnings in the former.
Another interesting comparison is between the United States, which has a Ghh index of
almost 40 points, and Sweden or Norway, where Ghh is of about 25 points. It is well known that
while the Scandinavian countries have a longer tradition of social security, family allowances,
labor market benefits, and other sources of public income support, in the US the level of
government intervention in the process of income-formation of households is more limited.
There are therefore reasons to expect that effects such as the “family income” or “other incomes”
effects would play a major role in the inequality difference between these countries.27
Surprisingly, about 80 and almost 90 percent of the difference between the US, and Norway and
Sweden, respectively, is accounted for by differences in the distribution of labor earnings alone.
4. Other Simulation Paths
There are three caveats to which these empirical results are subject. First, the income-sharing
pattern assumed so far may not be observed in reality. Some individuals who are classified as
belonging to a household may in fact not share their income with other members. This is a
potentially important issue,
20 but since few household surveys contain information on
expenditures from which to obtain a more adequate idea of the real sharing process, we are not
able to pursue this further. However, where country-specific equivalence scales are available,
they can easily be used within this framework. The two other caveats, already mentioned above,
are the path-dependency of our results, and the assumption of independence of each of the
decisions that lead to household and income formation.
If the decisions we identify through the simulation were totally independent of each other
and followed the life-cycle sequence proposed, the estimated effects would actually be regarded
as an explanation of the level of inequality. However, we know that in reality income and
household formation decisions are not totally independent of each other. For instance, we have
not considered that male earnings might have an effect on female participation, or that a
household’s decisions regarding female participation, fertility, and the incorporation of adults or
elderly into the unit may well be linked. It is difficult to predict the effects of these omissions
because a theoretical model predicting each effect is not available, so the implication is that our
results correspond to the upper bound of each individual effect. Interpreting each one purely as
separate effects may be an overestimation because they may be also capturing the effect of other
related decisions.
With respect to the choice of the decision-making path, we have selected a specific
sequence for performing the simulations, under the argument that the sequence has empirical
support, but if the sequence were modified, the magnitude of the effects would probably change.
The non-uniqueness of the results is not necessarily a drawback because the simulation method
can be easily adapted to other sequences by simply relaxing the assumptions in a different order.
                                                       
20 Carlson and Danziger (1999), for instance, conclude that the use of alternative sharing rules in the US has
important consequences for poverty estimates.28
It does not necessarily constitute a drawback for the empirical results, either, because the specific
path for empirical implementation is realistic.
21 Nevertheless, there are other reasonable
sequences that are worth exploring. In Table 5 we experiment with one alternative that seems
reasonable to us and test whether our empirical conclusions hold under this scenario.
 22
Specifically, we assume that individuals behave more in line with collective bargaining
models, rather than following a process of endogenous formation as before. Collective
bargaining is similar to the case where households first pool income from all sources and
individuals (columns 2 to 5 in Table 5), and then decide on the allocation by sharing or splitting
household income (columns 6 to 10 in Table 5).
23 The results differ between the simulations in
Tables 3 and 5, but it can be verified, for instance, that the factors driving the inequality
differences across regions are mostly unmodified. The only noticeable differences are that the
full “mating effect,” which appeared to be more equalizing in NA than in Scandinavia in Table 3,
now appears to be less equalizing in the US, and that the “fertility effect,” which was less
disequalizing in EE, is now more disequalizing. Although the factors driving the differences
across each region as well as Scandinavia sometimes change in importance, the sign mostly
remains the same. The same conclusion applies when we account for differences between the
most equal country in each region and the others.
5. Conclusions
This paper takes a microeconomic approach to examine what drives differences in inequality
across countries. The analysis addresses some of the limitations of the more common aggregate
approach, while providing additional information about why some countries have higher
                                                       
21 Moreover, path dependency is one distinctive characteristic of other widely used methodologies. One of them is
the decomposition of inequality by population subgroups, where typically an individual characteristic is chosen to
compute the proportion of inequality due to within and between group differences, respectively, and then other
characteristics are included sequentially to account for their effect. The effect of each characteristic always depends
on the specific sequence in which it is introduced. Another example is the widely used simulation by Juhn et al.
(1993), typically applied for decomposing changes in inequality over time. This technique decomposes the effect of
changes in personal characteristics and changes in the returns to each characteristic, over the change in inequality. In
this case also, the sequence in which characteristics are considered influences the magnitude of the results. Even
with these limitations, path-dependency has not prevented any of these approaches from being widely applied
because, as long as the path is reasonable theoretically or empirically, the results are useful.
22 Shorrocks (1999) suggests a method to obtain path-independent results from the decomposition of inequality by
population subgroups that could be implemented in our framework, but this requires a large number of simulations
with different paths, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
23 Behrman (1997), Bourguignon et al. (1995) and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) discuss these models in
detail.29
inequality than others. Specifically, our framework allows us to account for the importance of
individual decisions such as fertility, mating, labor force participation and household structure in
cross-country inequality comparisons, while at the same time presenting information about the
importance of different income sources.
Strictly speaking our results can only be interpreted as uncovering the causes of
inequality under special circumstances, so it is probably safer to view them as an accounting
procedure that identifies what drives the differences from a statistical point of view. In any case,
the simulations are useful because they are able to identify some of the channels through which
differences in inequality are generated, and they help assess the noise-to-signal ratio where the
data is not strictly comparable. Variables such as the years of schooling of the population, which
are commonly found to be strongly correlated with inequality in aggregate cross-country
regressions, may operate through these microeconomic channels (e.g., generating wage
inequality, as well as differences in participation and fertility), so identifying them is crucial for
policy design.
We use the simulation methodology to decompose differences in inequality of household
per capita income across 35 countries from six regions. By taking Scandinavia—the region with
the lowest inequality—as the benchmark we find that each of the effects we account for plays an
important role in generating regional differences in inequality. Western European countries
actually register lower labor market inequality than Scandinavian countries, but they end up with
higher inequality in the distribution of household per capita incomes because of the role of other
income sources. In contrast, most of the difference with North America surprisingly arises from
labor market inequalities rather than from public transfers, unemployment benefits or other
similar incomes that are linked with public compensatory mechanisms. Labor market inequalities
also play an important role in accounting for the difference with respect to Latin America,
Eastern Europe and Asia, but differences in fertility, mating patterns, and the importance of the
extended family also play a crucial role in the inequality gap with these regions.30
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Appendix
The LIS surveys typically report gross and net incomes, while in LAC only net incomes are
available. To reduce comparability problems our international comparisons refer to net
disposable incomes, although we include the inequality of gross incomes, where available, for
reference.
In all surveys disposable incomes are broadly classified into: (i) sources that individuals
receive directly, and with which a specific income-earner can be identified; and (ii) incomes that
individuals receive because they belong to a specific household, and to which a household can be
attached, but not a particular individual (see Appendix Table A2). The LIS surveys already
incorporate value added through harmonization of income sources and classification into these
two broad categories. The income sources for individuals in the LIS surveys are already divided
into labor earned incomes, unemployment compensation, and private and public pensions, while
household incomes are divided into cash property income, social transfers, means-tested
transfers, private transfers and other cash incomes. The LAC surveys include a variety of
sources, and if we use as reference the structure of the most complete surveys in terms of
coverage, the income sources for individuals can be classified into labor earned incomes, capital
incomes, property income, and transfers and pensions. When available, the incomes linked to the
household rather than to individual earners are non-monetary incomes (including imputed rents
in some cases), and there are only two countries (Ecuador and Peru) where other household
incomes are reported as such.
Thus, the major difference is that in the LAC data it is possible to identify the individual
incomes from capital, property and transfers, while in the LIS surveys these sources are not
attributed to a specific individual, but to the household. Additionally, unemployment
compensation is not typically included in LAC because in LA this is not an important source of
income.
Another aspect is that while labor earned incomes are more homogeneous, not all surveys
capture exactly the same non-labor income sources. We are able to document these differences in
detail for the LAC surveys, as is apparent in Appendix Table A2, but in the case of LIS, since the
data is already aggregated into the standardized categories we are not able to identify the original35
income sources covered in each questionnaire. So, we are not able to guarantee comparability of
non-labor income coverage for the LIS countries either.
24
                                                       
24 Other differences across surveys, are the timing of each survey, and the level of under-reporting (Székely and
Hilgert, 1999a), which we are not able to address due to the lack of information on the LIS surveys. To compute all
the Gini indexes in Table 1 and in the rest of the paper we drop all missing and zero incomes to avoid introducing an
element of arbitrariness into the estimation through imputation. Furthermore, we are not sure whether imputations
have already been performed to the original LIS data. In most LAC countries the proportion of these observations is
negligible, but in Argentina, Nicaragua and Venezuela, they account for more than 10 percent of the sample. In the
LIS surveys the proportion is generally small (typically around 0.5 per cent). The only cases were the proportion
exceeds 1 percent are Australia, Germany, Hungary and Russia, but even in these cases they do not exceed 5 per
cent of the total observations. We use the 1998 household survey for Paraguay rather than the 1995 survey, which is
also available to us, because the 1995 distribution is heavily driven by an outlier observation (see Székely and
Hilgert, 1999a for details). The Gini index for Nicaragua 1998 is not identical to the index we report in Székely and
Hilgert (1999b) for the same year because in that case non-monetary incomes were not available to us, and here we
have included them (1999). There are also slight differences between the Gini indexes for Venezuela and Chile that
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       Inequality by Income Source, Demographics and Family Arrangements
         Gini Index                                        Demographic and Family Characteristics       Gini Index   Gini  Gini
   Household incomes (%) (%) (%) Female Household Dependency  Personal incomes Household Household
Various Non- of of of Singe- Labor Size Rate Non-labor Labor Per capita Per capita Country
Sources Monetary Extended Nuclear Person Force Income Income Net Income Gross
Hhlds Hhlds Hhlds Particip. (Gy) (Gl) (Ghh) Income
0.41 0.50 0.08 0.47 3.86 1.46 59.15 57.33 59.06 1996 Brazil
0.36 0.54 0.10 0.57 4.20 2.12 71.31 55.83 58.77 1996 Bolivia
0.51 0.42 0.07 0.40 4.26 1.69 57.89 53.46 57.58 1997 Colombia
0.49 0.41 0.10 0.37 4.01 1.43 69.07 51.02 57.55 1997 Panama
0.47 0.45 0.08 0.62 4.67 1.88 60.33 51.91 56.92 1998 Paraguay
54.34 0.51 0.46 0.03 0.40 5.52 2.75 57.36 56.47 1998 Nicaragua
57.55 0.46 0.47 0.07 0.54 4.60 1.72 64.93 57.21 56.00 1995 Ecuador
51.48 0.49 0.43 0.07 0.37 3.95 1.29 68.90 56.06 56.02 1996 Chile
56.20 0.50 0.46 0.04 0.46 5.24 1.96 66.16 61.95 55.68 1998 Guatemala
0.53 0.43 0.04 0.40 5.31 2.66 50.70 52.84 1996 Honduras
58.70 0.45 0.49 0.06 0.40 4.55 2.05 59.03 53.98 52.76 1996 Mexico
67.19 0.54 0.40 0.06 0.41 4.65 1.94 60.00 47.09 50.48 1995 El Salvador
50.13 0.57 0.40 0.03 0.57 5.08 2.39 53.08 50.55 1997 Peru
0.53 0.42 0.06 0.28 4.29 1.85 55.25 47.15 48.10 1996 Dominican Rep.
0.42 0.42 0.15 0.37 3.49 1.36 45.78 42.58 47.02 1996 Argentina
0.52 0.42 0.06 0.40 4.58 1.80 61.23 41.57 47.03 1995 Venezuela
0.42 0.51 0.07 0.35 4.08 1.73 55.98 42.99 45.71 1995 Costa Rica
45.18 0.44 0.39 0.16 0.49 3.20 0.82 47.02 47.02 42.09 1995 Uruguay
55.10 0.48 0.45 0.07 0.44 4.42 1.83 60.13 51.57 52.81 Avg. LAC
76.10 0.18 0.39 0.38 0.65 1.87 0.21 45.65 47.61 39.79 44.04 1994 USA
68.21 0.19 0.43 0.34 0.60 1.96 0.22 43.69 40.54 31.38 35.44 1994 Canada
72.15 0.18 0.41 0.36 0.62 1.92 0.22 44.67 44.08 35.59 39.74 Avg. North America
59.98 0.15 0.52 0.32 0.60 1.89 0.30 46.09 36.58 36.80 39.66 1995 UK
72.92 0.42 0.40 0.18 0.37 2.45 0.74 30.72 27.28 35.57 36.21 1995 Italy
57.74 0.18 0.51 0.31 0.61 1.97 0.32 44.39 40.63 32.39 34.27 1994 France
65.20 0.11 0.16 0.73 0.52 1.89 0.39 40.46 35.49 31.80 33.66 1994 Netherlands
67.93 0.16 0.45 0.39 0.47 1.84 0.29 37.71 39.77 30.01 34.64 1994 Germany
53.52 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.43 2.14 0.56 28.63 29.17 26.94 26.94 1994 Luxembourg
62.88 0.21 0.43 0.36 0.50 2.03 0.43 38.00 34.82 32.25 34.23 Avg. Western Europe
64.41 0.13 0.42 0.44 0.61 1.76 0.15 41.26 36.27 25.67 29.35 1995 Norway
54.46 0.00 0.43 0.57 0.71 1.48 0.08 37.82 34.85 25.53 28.85 1995 Sweden
52.89 0.12 0.48 0.39 1.78 0.15 36.99 37.19 24.64 29.18 1995 Finland
57.26 0.08 0.44 0.47 0.66 1.68 0.12 38.69 36.10 25.28 29.12 Avg. Scandinavia
67.98 0.32 0.45 0.22 0.53 2.25 0.47 21.34 48.41 45.22 45.25 1995 Russia
56.46 0.32 0.45 0.22 0.49 2.30 0.75 24.48 27.58 34.62 37.49 1995 Poland
41.47 0.30 0.44 0.27 0.50 2.16 0.45 23.58 37.89 33.20 33.20 1994 Hungary
55.30 0.31 0.45 0.24 0.51 2.24 0.56 23.13 37.96 37.68 38.65 Avg. Eastern Europe
45.79 0.49 0.42 0.09 0.74 3.67 1.36 66.60 57.06 51.29 51.29 1996 Thailand
70.53 0.19 0.43 0.34 0.59 1.95 0.31 34.20 33.05 33.75 39.15 1994 Australia
61.88 0.49 0.42 0.09 0.49 2.96 1.00 53.76 31.08 29.87 30.27 1995 Taiwan
66.21 0.39 0.42 0.17 0.61 2.86 0.89 51.52 40.40 38.30 40.24 Avg. Asia
Correlation with Ghh:
0.41 0.56 -0.38 -0.29 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.74 0.79 Latin American Countries
0.03 0.67 -0.51 -0.47 0.64 0.28 0.58 0.26 0.68 Other Countries
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data38
Table 2
Process of Income Formation for Individual Earners
Gini Gini      Gini Labor Income Earners          Gini Hourly Wages 
All Non-labor Income All Hourly                              Population
Sources Incomes All Labor Wages         15-65 Years of Age Country
All Earners Other Earners Sources Income Male &
(Gy) (Gy,Yl>0) (Gl) (Gw,t) Female Females Males
(4) (3) (2) (1)
58.47 58.02 57.67 57.33 58.47 57.95 56.76 58.33 Brazil
57.03 65.23 55.89 55.83 57.55 57.06 56.75 57.15 Bolivia
54.69 56.21 54.12 53.46 56.10 55.54 57.32 54.41 Colombia
57.00 65.91 51.43 51.02 48.52 48.03 45.70 49.18 Panama
54.03 57.87 52.33 51.91 60.26 59.69 63.94 57.16 Paraguay
57.36 57.36 57.36 60.34 60.13 56.85 61.52 Nicaragua
59.89 65.34 56.79 57.21 58.68 58.95 56.96 59.71 Ecuador
61.28 67.40 56.62 56.06 59.11 57.91 61.88 55.70 Chile
61.74 65.80 61.00 61.95 60.34 59.86 59.13 59.94 Guatemala
50.70 50.70 50.70 53.25 52.69 53.78 52.13 Honduras
55.54 56.97 53.60 53.98 55.08 54.27 52.45 55.00 Mexico
50.60 60.92 46.15 47.09 47.82 47.16 46.95 46.69 El Salvador
53.08 0.00 53.08 53.08 52.85 51.88 51.30 51.89 Peru
49.88 54.53 47.86 47.15 47.95 47.50 46.66 47.48 Dominican Rep.
45.68 43.38 43.47 42.58 41.20 41.03 38.68 42.25 Argentina
45.06 61.56 41.59 41.57 43.74 43.13 43.32 43.01 Venezuela
46.10 56.53 42.94 42.99 42.65 42.21 43.67 41.57 Costa Rica
47.84 45.19 46.14 47.02 45.18 44.58 44.52 44.39 Uruguay
53.66 55.05 51.60 51.57 52.73 52.20 52.03 52.08 Avg. LAC
47.97 39.67 46.38 47.61 44.25 47.18 46.04 45.26 USA
39.35 24.30 38.05 40.54 34.25 40.44 40.47 38.02 Canada
43.66 31.98 42.21 44.08 39.25 43.81 43.25 41.64 Avg. North America
42.30 37.03 35.24 36.58 29.16 35.83 36.08 31.03 UK
30.18 29.59 26.67 27.28 28.27 27.21 26.16 26.58 Italy
40.63 40.90 39.02 40.63 34.30 40.54 39.60 39.48 France
35.25 51.05 34.21 35.49 26.26 35.43 38.90 28.16 Netherlands
37.94 28.98 37.83 39.77 35.23 39.46 38.25 35.32 Germany
29.00 26.83 28.60 29.17 27.56 29.07 33.69 24.12 Luxembourg
35.88 35.73 33.60 34.82 30.13 34.59 35.45 30.78 Avg. Western Europe
34.03 15.27 32.73 36.27 36.27 35.77 35.09 32.75 Norway*
31.25 36.27 30.19 34.85 25.00 34.70 33.75 32.51 Sweden
32.53 11.77 32.69 37.19 37.19 36.92 35.79 36.44 Finland*
32.60 21.10 31.87 36.10 32.82 35.80 34.88 33.90 Avg. Scandinavia
47.55 21.68 46.81 48.41 55.22 48.25 46.01 47.45 Russia
27.91 24.35 27.44 27.58 27.58 27.52 25.42 27.45 Poland*
35.86 19.81 36.48 37.89 37.02 37.64 35.65 37.98 Hungary
37.11 21.95 36.91 37.96 39.94 37.80 35.70 37.63 Avg. Eastern Europe
58.48 68.93 53.94 57.06 57.06 56.60 58.06 55.67 Thailand*
36.78 18.87 31.91 33.05 28.22 33.03 35.00 29.41 Australia
41.96 49.86 29.70 31.08 32.97 31.02 28.86 28.85 Taiwan
45.74 45.89 38.52 40.40 39.42 40.22 40.64 37.98 Avg. Asia
Correlation with Ghh:
0.81 0.63 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.82 Latin American Countries
0.79 0.49 0.76 0.68 0.77 0.69 0.66 0.70 Other Countries
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data
*Information on hours worked is not available for this survey.39
Table 3
Gini Index in the Process of Endogenous Family Formation
          Elderly Effect Extended Family Effect       Fertility Effect        Mating Effect Gini
Household Extended Extended All Match All Match Match Match All 
Income Family Family Nuclear Nuclear Couples couples with all all spouses Sources
Effect with all w/working w/ any Family with w/Children Working spouses with income All Earners Country
Elderly Elderly Adult working adults (Nuclear) Children
(Ghh) (Ghscae) (Ghscae,Ye>0) (Ghsca) (Ghsca, Ya>0) (Ghsc) (Ghsc,Yc>0) (Ghs) (Ghs,Ys>0) (Gy)
(9) (8b) (8a) (7b) (7a) (6b) (6a) (5b) (5a) (4)
59.07 59.08 59.35 59.11 61.64 56.04 57.63 56.99 58.47 Brazil
58.77 58.82 58.88 59.28 61.31 56.32 56.82 55.28 57.03 Bolivia
57.58 57.78 57.84 57.98 60.88 54.66 55.76 53.67 54.69 Colombia
57.55 57.59 57.76 57.89 61.41 55.37 56.22 55.74 57.00 Panama
56.92 56.97 57.19 56.88 59.51 52.72 56.01 52.87 54.03 Paraguay
56.47 58.68 58.78 58.93 59.07 62.68 56.88 58.65 56.39 57.36 Nicaragua
56.00 56.21 56.18 56.23 56.07 59.07 55.05 58.15 57.76 59.89 Ecuador
56.02 55.85 55.89 56.25 56.30 61.18 57.56 58.76 59.41 61.28 Chile
55.68 57.58 57.62 58.12 57.99 60.77 56.51 56.69 58.97 61.74 Guatemala
52.84 52.95 52.97 53.06 55.61 50.09 51.51 49.32 50.70 Honduras
52.76 53.61 53.63 53.69 53.92 57.11 51.41 53.20 52.87 55.54 Mexico
50.48 51.39 51.54 51.78 51.84 55.86 48.90 51.70 48.90 50.60 El Salvador
50.55 53.01 53.06 53.13 53.60 56.54 51.26 51.74 51.56 53.08 Peru
48.10 48.14 48.20 48.24 52.77 46.68 49.67 47.92 49.88 Dominican Rep.
47.71 47.69 48.05 47.95 51.73 44.20 45.87 44.53 45.68 Argentina
47.03 46.71 46.76 47.05 51.45 43.75 44.11 43.99 45.06 Venezuela
45.70 45.71 45.86 45.84 48.81 44.37 46.65 44.82 46.10 Costa Rica
42.09 43.16 43.18 43.88 43.62 47.24 42.77 43.81 44.60 47.84 Uruguay
53.66 53.38 53.41 53.60 53.65 56.98 51.36 52.94 51.98 53.66 Avg. LAC
39.79 40.59 40.57 40.60 40.18 41.38 41.14 40.39 44.01 47.97 USA
31.38 32.16 32.13 32.25 31.68 32.88 32.72 31.93 35.60 39.35 Canada
35.59 36.38 36.35 36.42 35.93 37.13 36.93 36.16 39.80 43.66 Avg. North America
36.80 37.06 37.06 37.02 36.55 37.34 36.81 37.14 38.58 42.30 UK
35.57 32.38 32.30 32.42 30.31 31.63 30.39 30.59 29.70 30.18 Italy
32.39 36.35 36.35 36.36 35.88 36.40 36.27 35.25 37.10 40.63 France
31.80 29.75 29.72 29.71 29.05 29.63 28.51 27.12 31.93 35.25 Netherlands
30.01 29.08 29.08 29.15 28.77 29.47 29.12 28.34 33.09 37.94 Germany
26.94 26.89 26.88 26.91 26.38 27.29 24.94 25.41 26.93 29.00 Luxembourg
32.25 31.92 31.90 31.93 31.16 31.96 31.01 30.64 32.89 35.88 Avg. Western Europe
25.67 27.89 27.88 27.89 27.59 28.36 28.43 27.31 31.06 34.03 Norway
25.53 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30 26.97 26.79 27.95 31.25 Sweden
24.64 28.14 28.14 28.15 27.86 27.75 28.02 26.84 30.26 32.53 Finland
25.28 27.78 27.77 27.78 27.58 27.80 27.81 26.98 29.76 32.60 Avg. Scandinavia
45.22 44.94 44.90 45.29 44.05 44.84 45.01 44.12 46.13 47.55 Russia
34.62 33.92 33.68 33.14 31.15 31.23 29.14 29.34 28.43 27.91 Poland
33.20 36.23 36.17 36.87 35.48 37.26 35.77 37.58 35.00 35.86 Hungary
37.68 38.37 38.25 38.43 36.89 37.78 36.64 37.01 36.52 37.11 Avg. Eastern Europe
51.29 54.80 54.87 54.96 55.18 59.46 55.45 57.37 56.22 58.48 Thailand
33.75 33.46 33.39 33.37 33.10 34.75 33.26 32.78 34.87 36.78 Australia
29.87 43.22 42.94 43.04 42.48 45.49 42.26 43.32 39.99 41.96 Taiwan
38.30 43.83 43.73 43.79 43.59 46.57 43.66 44.49 43.69 45.74 Avg. Asia
Correlation with Ghh:
0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.84 Latin American Countries
0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.79 Other Countries
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data40
Table 4
       Correlation Coefficients in the Process of Endogenous Family Formation
          Elderly Effect Extended Family Effect       Fertility Effect                   Mating Effect
Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Years of Hourly Country
Head & all Head & Head & all Head & Head & all Head & Head & all Head & Schooling Wages &
Elderly Elderly Adult Adult Children Children Spouses Spouse Head & Hours
Earners (Extended) Earners (Nuclear) Earners Earners Spouse
0.19 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.01 0.24 0.37 0.53 0.59 -0.10 Brazil
0.20 0.34 0.22 0.33 -0.01 0.10 0.27 0.35 0.68 -0.16 Bolivia
0.20 0.34 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.58 -0.02 Colombia
0.11 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.02 0.26 0.40 0.51 0.47 -0.08 Panama
0.20 0.42 0.19 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.27 -0.08 Paraguay
-0.06 -0.24 0.24 0.38 -0.00 0.26 0.36 0.50 0.57 -0.04 Nicaragua
0.38 0.51 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.17 0.37 0.51 0.60 -0.18 Ecuador
0.14 0.32 0.14 0.15 -0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.27 0.60 -0.12 Chile
0.02 0.20 0.15 0.23 -0.03 0.18 0.37 0.42 0.65 -0.06 Guatemala
0.01 0.33 0.07 0.18 -0.06 0.08 0.27 0.45 0.58 -0.16 Honduras
0.05 0.26 0.11 0.21 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.62 -0.10 Mexico
0.08 0.39 0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.13 0.24 0.43 0.62 -0.15 El Salvador
-0.04 0.24 0.08 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.20 0.45 0.62 -0.14 Peru
0.29 0.41 0.08 0.15 -0.02 0.11 0.26 0.42 0.52 -0.14 Dominican Rep.
0.13 0.08 0.05 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.29 0.46 0.44 -0.19 Argentina
0.03 0.22 0.16 0.27 -0.03 0.09 0.18 0.34 0.55 -0.13 Venezuela
0.29 0.47 0.07 0.19 -0.08 0.00 0.24 0.47 0.50 -0.16 Costa Rica
0.13 0.16 0.10 0.17 -0.02 0.14 0.20 0.34 0.46 -0.11 Uruguay
0.13 0.27 0.13 0.20 -0.02 0.13 0.25 0.40 0.55 -0.12 Avg. LAC
0.22 0.27 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.13 0.22 0.28 0.05 USA
0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.14 0.20 0.22 -0.06 Canada
0.13 0.18 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.21 0.25 -0.00 Avg. North America
0.09 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.18 0.25 -0.03 UK
0.15 0.18 0.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.32 0.59 -0.34 Italy
0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 0.16 0.32 0.47 0.02 France
0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.08 Netherlands
0.26 0.26 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 0.33 -0.06 Germany
0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 0.21 0.11 0.33 0.33 -0.26 Luxembourg
0.10 0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.20 0.39 -0.10 Avg. Western Europe
0.19 0.08 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.00 Norway
0.00 0.00 0.85 0.85 0.09 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.16 Sweden
0.29 0.29 0.18 0.16 -0.00 0.00 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.00 Finland
0.16 0.12 0.33 0.30 0.02 -0.01 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.05 Avg. Scandinavia
0.20 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.24 0.41 -0.16 Russia
0.09 0.27 0.13 0.21 -0.00 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.30 0.00 Poland
0.14 0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.38 0.44 0.43 -0.16 Hungary
0.14 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.38 -0.11 Avg. Eastern Europe
0.06 0.44 0.04 0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.12 0.30 0.56 0.00 Thailand
-0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.23 0.26 -0.10 Australia
0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.28 0.33 0.46 -0.25 Taiwan
0.00 0.16 0.05 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.21 0.29 0.51 -0.12 Avg. Asia
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data41
Table 5
Gini Index in the Process of Family Formation Through "pooling" & "sharing"
Income Splitting Effect Income Pooling Effect Gini
Household Nuclear All All Match Nuclear Nuclear Couples Match All 
Income Family Nuclear Couples all couples Family Family w/ Working Working Sources
Effect w/Adults & w/ any w/Children w/Adults & w/Working Children Couples All Earners Country
w/any Adult (Nuclear) w/Working Adults
Elderly Elderly (Gy)
(Ghscae) (Ghsca) (Ghsc) (Ghs) (Ghscae,Ye>0) (Ghsca,Ya>0) (Ghsc,Yc>0) (Ghs,Ys>0) (4)
59.07 59.25 61.43 60.35 54.16 54.44 55.96 56.99 58.47 Brazil
58.77 58.97 60.35 58.01 53.27 53.36 54.64 55.45 57.03 Bolivia
57.58 57.81 60.51 59.19 51.49 51.59 53.02 53.67 54.69 Colombia
57.55 57.55 60.76 59.04 51.94 52.19 54.40 55.74 57.00 Panama
56.92 57.09 58.85 58.07 49.90 50.05 51.70 52.87 54.03 Paraguay
56.47 58.68 58.93 63.31 62.14 54.53 54.59 55.95 56.39 57.36 Nicaragua
56.00 56.21 56.23 58.98 60.38 51.52 51.74 54.72 57.76 59.89 Ecuador
56.02 55.85 56.11 60.93 61.77 55.47 55.78 58.07 59.41 61.28 Chile
55.68 57.58 57.86 60.57 61.56 54.70 55.05 56.94 58.97 61.74 Guatemala
52.84 52.98 55.47 54.58 48.01 48.06 49.24 49.32 50.70 Honduras
52.76 53.61 53.66 57.36 57.07 50.64 50.73 52.21 52.87 55.54 Mexico
50.48 51.39 51.67 55.51 55.49 46.11 46.35 48.32 48.90 50.60 El Salvador
50.55 53.01 53.14 56.02 54.15 47.80 47.85 50.88 51.56 53.08 Peru
48.10 48.10 52.59 52.76 44.05 44.22 46.85 47.92 49.88 Dominican Rep.
47.02 47.95 51.54 48.73 41.82 42.33 43.93 44.53 45.68 Argentina
47.03 46.77 51.29 49.23 40.46 40.57 42.98 43.99 45.06 Venezuela
45.70 45.77 49.00 51.08 41.57 41.96 43.69 44.82 46.10 Costa Rica
42.09 43.16 43.78 47.75 47.98 40.32 41.11 43.55 44.60 47.84 Uruguay
53.34 53.53 56.79 56.20 48.76 49.00 50.95 51.99 53.66 Avg. LAC
39.79 40.47 40.65 43.05 42.88 39.97 40.11 41.77 43.83 47.97 USA
31.38 32.16 32.44 34.79 34.79 31.25 31.36 33.06 35.60 39.35 Canada
35.59 36.31 36.55 38.92 38.84 35.61 35.74 37.41 39.71 43.66 Avg. North America
36.80 35.54 35.76 37.00 37.29 35.31 35.35 35.98 36.78 42.30 UK
35.57 32.38 32.56 33.93 34.10 28.62 28.68 29.58 29.70 30.18 Italy
32.39 36.35 36.60 37.67 37.19 34.90 34.96 36.28 37.10 40.63 France
31.80 29.75 29.73 30.03 28.61 29.65 29.64 30.31 31.93 35.25 Netherlands
30.01 29.83 30.11 31.99 31.37 31.30 31.34 32.52 33.33 37.94 Germany
26.94 26.89 27.34 30.79 29.82 26.14 26.33 26.83 26.93 29.00 Luxembourg
32.25 31.79 32.02 33.57 33.06 30.99 31.05 31.92 32.63 35.88 Avg. Western Europe
25.67 26.33 26.40 27.99 27.76 25.30 25.29 26.42 28.99 34.03 Norway
25.53 27.30 27.30 27.30 26.91 26.63 26.63 26.63 27.95 31.25 Sweden
24.64 28.14 28.68 29.05 28.62 27.04 27.07 27.49 30.26 32.53 Finland
25.28 27.26 27.46 28.11 27.76 26.32 26.33 26.85 29.07 32.60 Avg. Scandinavia
45.22 44.94 45.68 47.11 46.97 43.96 44.26 45.85 46.13 47.55 Russia
34.62 33.92 33.33 32.24 30.90 29.19 28.69 28.47 28.43 27.91 Poland
33.20 36.23 39.66 36.23 36.92 38.62 39.76 33.66 33.86 35.86 Hungary
37.68 38.37 39.56 38.53 38.26 37.26 37.57 35.99 36.14 37.11 Avg. Eastern Europe
51.29 54.80 50.23 54.80 54.94 59.18 58.90 53.33 53.39 58.48 Thailand
33.75 33.46 33.54 36.57 36.09 31.82 31.87 33.11 34.87 36.78 Australia
29.87 42.92 42.81 47.52 47.88 36.86 37.21 39.34 39.60 41.96 Taiwan
38.30 43.72 42.19 46.30 46.30 42.62 42.66 41.93 42.62 45.74 Avg. Asia
Correlation with Ghh:
0.99 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.84 Latin American Countries
0.87 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.79 Other Countries
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data42
Appendix Table A1
                    Data Sources
Country Year Source Name of the survey
1 Argentina 96 LAC Encuesta Permanente de Hogares
2 Bolivia 96 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
3 Brazil 97 LAC Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
4 Chile 96 LAC Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional
5 Colombia 97 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo
6 Costa Rica 97 LAC Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
7 Dominican Rep. 96 LAC Encuesta Nacional de  Fuerza de Trabajo
8 Ecuador 95 LAC Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
9 El Salvador 97 LAC Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
10 Guatemala 98 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares
11 Honduras 96 LAC Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
12 Mexico 96 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares
13 Nicaragua 98 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida
14 Panama 97 LAC Encuesta de Hogares
15 Paraguay 95 LAC Encuesta de Hogares - Mano de Obra
16 Peru 97 LAC Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza
17 Uruguay 97 LAC Encuesta Continua de Hogares 
18 Venezuela 97 LAC Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra
19 Thailand 96 LAC Socio-Economic Survey
20 Australia 94 LIS Australian Income and Housing Survey
21 Canada 94 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
22 Finland 95 LIS Income Distribution Survey
23 France 94 LIS Family Budget Survey
24 Germany 94 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
25 Hungary 94 LIS Hungarian Income Survey
26 Italy 95 LIS The Bank of Italy Survey
27 Luxembourg 94 LIS The Luxembourg Household Panel Study
28 Netherlands 94 LIS Socio-Economic Panel
29 Norway 95 LIS Income and Property Distribution Survey
30 Poland 95 LIS Household Budget Survey
31 Taiwan 95 LIS Survey of Personal Income Distribution Survey
32 Russia 95 LIS Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
33 Sweden 95 LIS Income Distribution Survey
34 United Kingdom 95 LIS The Family Expenditure Survey
35 United States 94 LIS March Current Population Survey
LIS refers to data processed through the Luxembourg Income Study
LAC refers to data processed by Székely and Hilgert with direct access to the household survey data.43
Appendix Table A2
Income Source Coveratge
Country                          Individual Income Sources Household Income Sources
                     LAC                                                    LIS
Cash Other Total Total Other
Labor Property Capital Transfers Unemp't Non- Imputed  property social  ins. means  private  cash
Rent Rent & Pensions Compen. Monetary Rent income  transfers tested inc. transfers income
Argentina X Xb Xb Xb
Bolivia X X X X
Brazil X X Xc X
Chile X X X X X X
Colombia X Xa Xa X X
Costa Rica X Xb Xb Xb
Dominican Rep. X X X X
Ecuador X X X X X X X
El Salvador Xd Xb Xb Xb Xd X
Guatemala X X X X X X
Honduras X
Mexico X X X X X X
Nicaragua X X
Panama X Xa Xa X
Paraguay X X X X Xd
Peru X X X X X X X
Uruguay X X X X X X
Venezuela X Xb Xb Xb
Thailand X X X X X X
Australia X X X X X X X X
Canada X X X X X X X
Finland X X X X X X X X
France X X X X X X X X
Germany X X X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X X X X
Italy X X X X X X X X
Luxembourg X X X X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X X
Poland X X X X X X X X
Taiwan X X X X X X
Russia X X X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X
United States X X X X X X X X
a. Can not separate between property and capital rent.
b. Can not separate between property rent, capital rent, and transfers.
c. Can not separate capital rent from other sources.
d. Can not separate nonmonetary income from labor income.
e. Nonmonetary income available only for urban areas44
Appendix Table A3
                               Sources of Income in Each Household Survey
(% of Total Income)
      Income Sources       Income Sources
 at the Household level       for Individuals
Family Non-Monetary Non-Labor Labor
Income Income Income Income Country
18.87 81.13 1996 Brazil
15.61 84.39 1996 Bolivia
14.31 85.69 1997 Colombia
25.24 74.76 1997 Panama
11.53 88.47 1998 Paraguay
9.06 90.94 1998 Nicaragua
11.68 7.96 4.10 76.26 1995 Ecuador
9.92 12.31 77.92 1996 Chile
15.05 12.27 72.50 1998 Guatemala
100.00 1996 Honduras
24.02 10.55 65.43 1996 Mexico
3.91 7.56 88.66 1995 El Salvador
16.85 13.95 69.20 1997 Peru
18.07 81.93 1996 Dominican Rep.
18.10 82.23 1996 Argentina
6.88 93.12 1995 Venezuela
11.70 88.30 1995 Costa Rica
16.91 24.84 58.25 1995 Uruguay
14.13 81.07 Avg. LAC
10.81 13.67 75.52 1994 USA
11.94 16.97 71.09 1994 Canada
11.37 15.32 73.31 Avg. North America
19.29 16.73 63.98 1995 UK
8.63 26.28 65.09 1995 Italy
13.32 25.54 61.14 1994 France
18.49 24.44 57.07 1994 Netherlands
9.36 23.57 67.08 1994 Germany
12.42 19.26 68.32 1994 Luxembourg
13.58 22.64 63.78 Avg. Western Europe
16.21 19.22 64.57 1995 Norway
20.74 34.13 45.12 1995 Sweden
18.30 31.43 50.27 1995 Finland
18.42 28.26 53.32 Avg. Scandinavia
12.54 18.62 68.84 1995 Russia
21.88 21.40 56.72 1995 Poland
16.92 22.29 60.78 1994 Hungary
17.11 20.77 62.11 Avg. Eastern Europe
12.88 15.70 70.99 1996 Thailand-RES
12.52 8.50 78.98 1994 Australia
12.52 5.89 81.59 1995 Taiwan-RES
12.52 10.03 77.19 Avg. Asia
Source: Authors' calculations from household survey data